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Abstract 
 
“Why do banks squeeze their lending activity” is an oft-repeated question during the times of 
financial crisis. This study examines an emerging economy’s banking system, and contributes 
to the evolving body of literature on the topic by providing answers to what causes the 
sluggish bank credit during times of recession. By employing cointegration technique, the 
study shows that bank credit has a significant positive relationship with the borrowing 
activities of debt users of the banks, hence, as the contrary an inverse relationship with 
investment activity is evident during financial crisis. Accordingly, we suggest that banks 
could increase their lending by increasing the borrowings rapidly either from the Central 
Banks or from Government supported long term lending institutions during recessionary 
periods. 
 
Key Words: Time series models, Financial markets, Interest rates, Bank lending, Financial 
crisis, Credit declines 
JEL Classification: C22, D53, E43, E51, G21 
_____________________________________________ 
 
1. Introduction 
The 2007-8 global financial crisis also termed as ‘the great recession’ led to a grave banking 
panic and threw most of the economies of the world into severe recession. That crisis is 
attributed as having been caused by several factors. But only few of the factors are associated 
with the housing and credit markets, the two commonly-cited factors. Insinuated causes 
include the insolvency of homeowners to meet their mounting mortgage payments, unusually 
high levels of personal and corporate debt levels, foolhardy financial product innovation, the 
collapse of vital financial institutions and awful errors of judgment by credit rating agencies 
in the rating of structured products. Macroeconomic factors have also been added: monetary 
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policy, excessive liberalisation, global trade imbalances and ineffective government 
regulation.  
Without refuting the impairing effects of the above factors, we believe that the origins of 
the global financial crisis lie in the rational profit-seeking behavior of banks. Indeed, we 
consider that reason in the course of economic expansion is a vital cause behind the pro-
cyclical financial infirmity of any economic system given bank’s heightened sensitivity to a 
financial shock. 
The global financial crisis has spread across the world through a range of financial as 
well as real economy channels. Cross-border bank lending has also been one of the major 
financial channels through which stresses in the global financial system are and were spread 
to other emerging economies. While for some economies in Europe, the transmission conduit 
for the losses on account of toxic assets was obvious and thereby increased the fragility of 
bank balance sheets. However, for some Asian economies such as that of India, the story was 
a bit different as the exposure of their domestic banks was lot less limited to such 
international toxic assets. Yet even these economies with little exposure did experience a 
substantial slow down. Hence, toxic assets alone cannot explain the virility of the effect. 
The connection of a recession to banking crisis is an intensely problematic research 
issue. The consequent fall in bank lending experienced in both the exposed or little exposed 
economies has key implications for growth. However, the sag in credit supply puts upward 
pressure on interest rate spreads, and thereby leads to an inordinate fall in lending than one 
might see in a typical recession. What makes the banks squeeze their lending activity during 
the crisis? It is an oft-repeated question, which deserves re-examination to find credible 
economic reason(s) applicable across diverse banking systems across the globe. The available 
literature, though throws up some interesting insights. We attempt to find some more answers 
from a rather relatively conservative banking system like that of an emerging economy in 
India. Indian banking similar to much of Asian banking is characterized by sizeable 
proportion of ownership under government control, and is distinct from the free market and 
widely-held banks of the Anglo-Saxon model. 
This paper is one among the relatively small family of works that underline the 
relationship between bank behavior and financial instability. It aims to analyze how the 
financial crisis passed through the banks’ lending behavior. Our endeavor in this study is to 
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understand the impact of financial uncertainty and instability on banks’ behavior on credits 
more specifically the effect of the crisis on the lending behaviour of the banks.  
We begin by presenting in section 2, the theoretical framework illustrating the recent 
approaches on financial instability placing the banking system at the epicenter of analysis. 
We analyze more specifically how financial instability affects the bank’s lending behavior 
during times of economic shocks or crisis. The methodology involving the data and its 
sources and research design explaining the empirical framework including how to estimate 
the impact of factors as is done in section 3. The results of the analyses of the findings are 
presented in section 4. The conclusion and policy implications are offered in section 5. 
 
2. Financial instability and Bank Lending behavior 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
Global financial system saw an extraordinarily high economic growth with abundant liquidity 
from 2001 to 2007. It is established empirically that the origins of the global financial crisis 
can be traced to the low interest rate policies adopted by the Federal Reserve and other 
central banks after the burst of the dot com bubble in October, 1999. An exhaustive summary 
of the events preceding and accompanying the global financial crisis is offered in Allen and 
Carletti (2010), Brunnermeir (2009), Greenlaw et al. (2008) and Taylor (2008). The sudden 
outbreak of financial crisis in September 2008 (the worst month) affected banks across the 
globe with uncertainty and resulted in instability in the markets for several years. Banks 
reacted to the crisis by reducing their lending exposure (Ivanshina and Scharfstein, 2008). 
This behavior is contrary because banks would be hesitant to cut their lending too drastically 
in view of their enduring relationships with the borrowers. If such relationships terminated 
suddenly, it would prove to be too costly in furthering their business in future (Rajan, 1992; 
Ongena, 1999). Further, Ralph de Haas and Neeltje van Horen (2009) have found that, during 
a financial crisis, arranging banks retain large portions of loans and forge more concentrated 
syndicates, signifying an heightened need to screen and monitor borrowers.  
Few economists building their analysis on a variety of analytical tools and hypotheses 
have scrutinized the association between bank behavior and financial uncertainty. One school 
of thought emphasizes the crucial role of uncertainty and confidence in the emergence of an 
endogenous mechanism of financial instability impelled by the dynamics of asset prices and 
3
Swamy: Financial instability, uncertainty and bank lending behavior
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
77 
 
banking behavior. The most archetypal and leading work adopting this approach was the 
“financial instability hypothesis” of Hyman P. Minsky which, basing on the financial concept 
of economic fluctuations states that economy’s inherent tendency to transform itself into an 
unstable financially fragile system is dependent on the naive interplay of the profit-seeking 
behavior of economic agents. In the Minskyan model of financial instability, the profit–
seeking behavior of banks in an uncertain decision-making environment leads them to such 
financial practices that stem out to a situation of escalating financial fragility. 
Of late, macroeconomic models grounded on asymmetric information also single out the 
role played by banks at the core of the assessment of financial instability and contend that the 
crux of financial crises is in the vulnerabilities of the banking sector. Mishkin (1999a and 
1999b) argues that increase in information asymmetry spawns ex ante a cumulative risk of 
adverse selection and produces ex-post a proliferation in moral hazard, which is coped by 
limiting credits by the financial intermediaries. As asymmetries of information are ubiquitous 
in financial markets, any crisis that escalates the asymmetries of information like impairing of 
banking or non-banking intermediaries’ balance sheets, escalating interest rates, fall in asset 
prices and compounding uncertainty would and must cause in a curtailment of credits. 
Another school of thought emphasizes that the balance-sheet exposures (Allen et al., 2002) 
like maturity mismatches, currency mismatches, capital structure problems and solvency 
issues could contribute to a currency and banking crisis.  
An empirical study by Calomiris and Wilson (2004) look into the causal link from the 
escalating credit risk by way of decreased bank funding to lower credit supply. Demirgüç-
Kunt, Detragiache and Gupta (2006) notice a similar kind of evidence for an extensive 
country sample. Besides limiting the risk of their asset portfolio, the authors observe that 
banks quite often build up their capital buffer to insulate depositors from credit risk. Because 
of such ‘deleveraging’, bank lending tends to moderate considerably during the times of 
financial crises (De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2006). 
2.2 Financial Soundness  
One of the important sources of vulnerability that can lead to a financial crisis can be the 
weakness (such as a high level of short-term debt) in the financial structure of the economy 
i.e., the composition and the size of the assets and liabilities on the balance sheet. A financial 
crisis follows when the demand for financial assets of one or more sectors plummet and 
consequently the banking system fails to meet the outflows or may be unable to attract new 
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financing or roll over existing short-term liabilities. In this direction, financial soundness 
(Table-1) matters much during the financial crisis because it gives some indication of how 
likely it is that financial problems would be transmitted into the real economy (by, for 
example) a reduction in the supply of loans. 
Table 1:  Core financial soundness indicators of selected countries (percent) 
 
 Australia France UK USA Russia China India Brazil 
South 
Africa 
Capital Adequacy Ratio [CAR] 
2005 10.2 11.3 12.8 12.9 16.0 2.5 12.8 17.9 12.3 
2006 10.3 10.9 12.9 13.0 14.9 4.9 12.3 18.9 12.3 
2007 10.1 10.2 12.6 12.8 15.5 8.4 12.3 18.7 12.8 
2008 11.3 10.5 12.9 12.8 16.8 12.0 13.0 18.2 13.0 
2009 11.9 12.4 14.8 14.3 20.9 11.4 13.2 18.8 14.1 
2010 11.4 12.3 15.9 15.3 18.1 12.2 13.6 17.8 14.9 
Non-Performing Assets [NPA] 
2005 0.6 3.5 1.0 0.7 2.6 8.6 5.2 3.5 1.8 
2006 0.6 3.0 0.9 0.8 2.4 7.1 3.3 3.5 1.1 
2007 0.6 2.7 0.9 1.4 2.5 6.2 2.5 3.0 1.4 
2008 1.3 2.8 1.6 3.0 3.8 2.4 2.3 3.1 3.9 
2009 2.0 3.6 3.5 5.4 9.5 1.6 2.3 4.2 5.9 
2010 2.2 4.2 4.0 4.9 8.2 1.1 2.4 3.1 5.8 
Provisions to NPA s 
2005 17.6 … 54.0 154.8 176.9 24.8 60.3 179.7 59.4 
2006 17.6 … 54.6 134.8 170.8 34.3 58.9 179.9 54.5 
2007 18.3 … … 91.7 144.0 39.2 56.1 181.9 44.9 
2008 21.9 70.0 38.1 74.4 118.4 116.4 52.6 189.0 31.4 
2009 22.6 63.2 41.1 57.7 95.8 155.0 52.1 156.7 29.6 
2010 22.0 62.3 35.4 64.2 103.7 218.3 51.5 171.1 32.6 
Return on Assets [ROA] 
2005 1.8 0.6 0.8 1.8 3.2 0.6 0.9 3.0 1.2 
2006 1.7 0.6 0.5 1.8 3.3 0.9 0.9 2.7 1.4 
2007 1.6 0.4 0.4 1.2 3.0 0.9 0.9 2.9 1.4 
2008 0.9 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 1.8 1.0 1.0 1.4 2.1 
2009 1.0 0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.9 0.9 
2010 1.2 0.6 0.2 0.9 1.9 1.0 1.1 2.1 1.0 
Return on Equity [ROE] 
2005 25.6 11.8 11.8 17.8 24.2 15.1 13.3 29.8 15.2 
2006 27.8 14.0 8.9 17.2 26.3 14.9 12.7 27.6 18.3 
2007 30.2 9.8 6.2 11.2 22.7 16.7 13.2 28.9 18.1 
2008 18.9 -1.0 -10.3 -1.6 13.3 17.1 12.5 14.9 28.7 
2009 17.4 8.2 2.6 -0.6 4.9 16.2 13.1 20.4 15.8 
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2010 20.5 13.3 3.9 8.2 12.5 17.5 12.5 21.7 14.7 
Data Source: IMF – All Countries FSI Data. 
2.3 Trends in Bank Credit 
Bank credit has shown a robust upward trend in most emerging economies until around 
2007. One of the focal issues is the extent to which there was a decline in credit growth 
during the recession period and how it affected credit supply or demand. A decline in credit 
supply would imply that the impact of the crisis on the financial sector has swelled the effects 
of the very large cyclical downturn. On the contrary, if demand effects were cogent, this 
would indicate that efforts to supply financing and support the operation of the financial 
sector have been successful in boosting credit supply and mitigating the adverse effects of the 
crisis in developed financial markets. Growth in domestic credit in select economies 
particularly during the crisis period has nosedived in almost all the economies though the 
extent may vary (Figure 1). However, it is interesting that the experiences of BRICS 
countries are quite different form that of other developed countries in view of the nature of 
their economies.    
Figure 1: Domestic credits of select economies over 2006-10 
(Consolidated balance sheet of the banking sector) 
 
 
     Source: IMF Dataset: Principal Global Indicators. 
 
It is but natural to have our curiosity to understand the lending behaviour of the banks in 
such emerging economies, which showed some sense of resilience to financial crisis in view 
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of their strong domestic demand, led growth. We examine the trend of bank credit in India, 
which is representative of a rather domestic focused banking sector when compared to other 
developed markets. The trend of bank credit in India even during the crisis period has 
experienced an upward trajectory despite huge constraining factors (Figure 2).    
Figure 2: Trend of bank credits in India over 2007-11 
 
Source: Figure developed based on the data from Reserve Bank of India Publications 
 
Banking sector being an integral part of the economy in ensuring the efficient 
transmission of the funds, it has a close relationship with the other macro-economic factors 
that play a vital part in the economic development. Despite the downward movement of some 
of the economic indicators like the imports and exports, the bank credit has continued to 
show rising trend in view of the strong domestic demand led growth (Figure 3).  
Figure 3: Indian economic indicators over 2007-10 
 
          Data Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS) of IMF. 
 
Further, the core financial selector indicators for India like; Capital Adequacy Ratio 
(CAR), Capital Adequacy Ratio–Tier-1, Gross Non-Performing Assets (GNPAs) to total 
loans, Net Non-Performing Assets (NNPAs) to total loans and Return on Equity (ROE) have 
7
Swamy: Financial instability, uncertainty and bank lending behavior
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
81 
 
experienced downward pressure during the recession period (Figure-4). On the contrary, 
liquid assets to total assets ratio has moved upwards indicating the tendency of the banks to 
hold cash during the times of recession instead of investing in loans or investment products. 
Figure 4: Core financial sector indicators for India over 2008-10 
 
 
         Data Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS) of IMF 
 
Interest Rates (Benchmark prime lending rate), Money market rate and the discount rates) 
which have significant impact on the lending activity showed downward movement in the 
Indian banking scenario (Figure 5).  
Figure-5: Interest rates in India over 2007-10  
 
         Data Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS) of IMF 
 
Of course, banks claim that sluggish bank lending was due to a fall in demand but they 
have tightened the terms of credit on which borrowers can access funds. However, given the 
backdrop of the above discussed understanding of the behavior of the banking sector during 
the recession period, we try to find answer for our specific question, how was the lending 
behavior of the banks during the recession and which was the strongly correlated determinant 
for bank credits. 
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3. Empirical Framework and Estimation 
We use data on bank behavior in India to provide fresh insights into how banks respond to 
financial crises especially in the area of credit supply. The framework of our empirical 
analysis is based on a robust database and well-established techniques. 
3.1 Data and the Key Variables 
The weekly data on Commercial Banks in India for the study period has been sourced 
from the robust database of Reserve Bank of India (various issues of Statistical Tables 
Relating to Banks in India and Report of Trend and Progress of Banking in India).  
Table 2: Definitions for key variables in our models 
 
Variable Description 
Bank Credit LnBC Logarithm of Bank Credit (total of outstanding credit for all the scheduled commercial banks in India)  
Aggregate 
Deposits LnAD 
Logarithm of Aggregate Deposits (total of outstanding 
aggregate deposits held by all the scheduled 
commercial banks in India) 
Investments LnINVEST 
Logarithm of Investments (total of outstanding 
investments by all the scheduled commercial banks in 
India) 
Money at Call 
and Short Notice LnMATCAL 
Logarithm of Money at Call and Short Notice (total of 
all Money at Call and Short Notice held by all the 
scheduled commercial banks in India) 
Borrowings LnBORROW 
Logarithm of Borrowings (total of all outstanding 
Borrowings by all the scheduled commercial banks in 
India) 
Bank Nifty LnBNIFTY 
Logarithm of Bank Nifty index of NSE which is 
considered to be most representative index for 
understanding the market performance of banks in India 
Lending Rates LnBPLR 
Logarithm of BPLR (Benchmark Prime Lending Rates) 
rates which represent the average levels of bank lending 
rates in India 
Cash-Deposit 
Ratio CashDR 
Ratio of Cash held by banks to their Aggregate 
Deposits   
Investment-
Deposit Ratio IDR 
Ratio of outstanding Investments to Aggregated 
Deposits of banks  
Credit-Deposit 
Ratio CDR 
Ratio of Outstanding Credit to Aggregate Deposit levels 
of banks 
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The choice of the period is made in line with the need of the study to compare and 
analyze the impact of financial crisis on the bank lending activity. Accordingly, we have set 
three distinct comparable time horizons keeping in mind the availability of the weekly data. 
Phase-1 covers the period from Dec 2006 to July 2008 to represent the pre-recession 
(boom/normal) period, Phase-2 covers the period from August 2008 to March 2010 to 
represent the recession period and finally the Phase-3 includes the period from April 2010 to 
March 2011 to capture the recovery period. Further, the variables used for the analysis 
include important determinants of bank behavior and are detailed in Table 2. 
Credit to Deposit Ratio (CDR) is one of the indicators that is used to measure / reflect 
the bank/s’ efficiency in credit delivery. A careful look at its trend gives a broader trend of 
the banks’ credit supply activity. Though this ratio involves the outstanding levels, it captures 
the inclusive picture of the credit delivery activity. Figure 6 captures the volatile movement 
of CDR during the study period. During the recession period, the CDR has experienced an 
uncertain downward tumble and has found an upward pitch during the subsequent recovery 
period.  
Figure 6: Trend of credit to deposit ratio over 2007-11 
   Source: Reserve Bank of India Database. 
We look at the trend of Investment to Deposit Ratio (IDR) during the study period. 
Figure-7 presents the interesting movement of IDR wherein we notice that the movement is 
almost opposite to that of CDR during the recesssion period which indicates that banks were 
hesitant towards credit delivery and turned towards safe investment of their avaailable funds 
instead of the riskier lending activity. 
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Figure 7: Trend of investment to deposit ratio in India over 2006-11 
                 Source: Reserve Bank of India Database 
We take a look at the liquidity management of the banks during the study period and 
find that Cash to Deposit Ratio which indicates the cash holding levels of the banks was 
sliding down during the recession period (Figure 8). This denotes the tight funds mangement 
scenario during the recession period due to the impact of the crisis.  
Figure 8: Cash to deposit ratio in India over 2006-11 
 
                    Source: Reserve Bank of India Database 
 
3.2 The Model 
Bank Credit has direct relationship with the predictor variables such as Aggregate 
Deposits, Borrowings, Investments, Money at Call and Short Notice, Bank Nifty and Lending 
Rates. Accordingly, we frame the following quadratic equation. 
Yt = α + β1X1t + …………… + βnXnt + µ            (1)            
Accordingly, Bank Credit can be better explained and estimated with the following 
version of equation. 
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BC = ƒ [AD, INVEST, MATCAL, BORROW, BNIFTY, BPLR] + µ   (2) 
Due to potential nonlinearities, the natural logarithms of the regressors are considered 
accordingly, when we log-transform this model we obtain: 
LnBC = α + LnAD + LnINVEST + LnMATCAL + LnBORROW + LnBNIFTY +   
  +LnBPLR + µ       (3)  
    
      We expect the borrowings to have a close positive relationship with the bank credit 
during the recession in view of the tight liquidity and decreasing deposits mobilization 
scenario. Further, we also predict that as the banks are guided by their profit seeking 
behaviour they tend to curtail their lending activity and try to invest their funds in the assured 
investments instead of venturing into the risky activity of lending. 
3.3 Methodology  
        Given that we are dealing with time series data, the possibility of non-stationarity of the 
variables cannot be ruled out. We perform stationarity test on the variables that are included 
in our analysis to ensure that the results from the analysis are not spurious. For this purpose, 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (hereafter, ADF) test and Phillips and Perron (hereafter, PP) 
(1988) tests are conducted to know the stationarity of the variables.  
     (4) 
( ) 
     (5) 
) 
Further, 
    (6)  
 Yt  is a  random walk  with a drift with linear time trend  if γ=0. The ADF test mentioned 
above assumes that the errors are statistically independent and have a constant variance. In 
case of PP test, the assumption is relaxed, allows the error disturbances to be weakly 
dependent, and heterogeneously distributed.  
This can be written as: 
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       (7) 
In both the tests the null hypothesis is that the series is non-stationary (possess a unit root) 
and if the calculated value exceeds the critical value (based on Mackinnon, 1996 for ADF and 
PP test), the null hypothesis may be rejected implying the stationary characteristics of the 
data series. The ADF test is a parametric auto regression to ARIMA structure of the errors in 
the test regression, but the PP test corrects for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the 
errors. In ADF test, Schwarz Information criteria (SIC) have been used to select the 
appropriate lag length, whereas in PP test we have used the Newey-West using Bartlet kernel 
method.  
We use a Cointegration framework to identify systematic interaction effects between the 
identified determinants of lending behaviour of banks. Accordingly, Johansen's Cointegration 
technique was employed to verify the existence of cointegration between the determinants of 
bank credit and other determinants as mentioned above. Once the order of integration of each 
variable is determined in three periods, the concept of Cointegration by Johansen and Juselius 
(1990) method (hereafter JJ method)1 is used to examine the existence of cointegrating 
relationship between the determinants.  
This method is considered to be more robust than the Engel Granger procedure (based 
the residual). Therefore, we prefer the JJ method, which uses the Vector Auto Regressive 
(VAR) model to test the number of cointegrating vectors, and the estimation is based on 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) method. Following Johansen (1988), Johansen, and Juselius 
(1990) VAR representation of column vector Xt can be written as follows: 
tit
k
i
itt XBzX ε+Π+= −
=
∑ )(
1
)(
     (8) 
Where Xt is column vector of n endogenous variables, z is a (n×1) vector of deterministic 
variables, ε is a (n × 1) vector of white noise error terms, and Πi is a (n×n) matrix of 
coefficients. Since, most of the macroeconomic time series variables are non-stationary, VAR 
of such models are generally estimated in first-difference forms.  
JJ test provides two Likelihood Ratio (LR) test statistics for cointegration analysis, the 
trace (λtrace) statistics, and the maximum eigenvalue (λmax) statistics. The trace statistics tests 
                                                          
1 See Philips(1991),Cheung and Lai(1993) and Gonzala (1994). 
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the null hypothesis that the number of cointegrating relations is r against k cointegration 
relations, where k is the number of endogenous variables. The maximum eigenvalue test, 
tests the null hypothesis that there are r-cointegrating vectors against an alternative of r+1 
cointegrating vectors. To determine the rank of matrix Π, the test values obtained from the 
two test statistics are compared with the critical value from Mackinnon-Haug-Michelis 
(1999). For both tests if the test statistic value is greater than the critical value, the null 
hypothesis of r cointegrating vectors is rejected in favor of the corresponding alternative 
hypothesis. 
 
4. Analysis of Results 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 present the correlations statistics of the determinants employed in the 
analysis for the pre-recession period, recession period and recovery period. During the Pre-
Recession period LnBC has strong positive correlations with; LnAD (0.983), LnINVEST 
(0.946), LnBORROW (0.811), LnBPLR (0.433) at 0.01% level of significance (Table-3). 
Table 3: Correlations statistics (pre-recession period) 
 
 LnAD LnBORROW 
LnMAT
CAL 
LnINV
EST 
LnBNI
FTY 
LnBP
LR LnBC 
LnAD 1       
LnBORROW .753** 1      
LnMATCAL -.256* .113 1     
LnINVEST .977** .728** -.295** 1    
LnBNIFTY .319** .041 -.328** .421** 1   
LnBPLR .514** .184 -.284** .473** .372** 1  
LnBC .983** .811** -.162 .946** .215* .433** 1 
      **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 4: Correlations statistics (recession period) 
 
 LnAD LnBORROW 
LnMAT
CAL 
LnINV
EST 
LnBPL
R 
LnBNI
FTY LnBC 
LnAD 1       
LnBORROW -.214* 1      
LnMATCAL -.723** .461** 1     
LnINVEST .980** -.241* -.725** 1    
LnBPLR -.863** .138 .609** -.899** 1   
LnBNIFTY .788** -.406** -.775** .764** -.573** 1  
LnBC .964** -.135 -.659** .916** -.797** .698** 1 
      **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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During the Recession period LnBC has strong positive correlations with; LnAD (0.964), 
LnINVEST (0.916), LnBNIFTY (0.698) at 0.01% level of significance and has negative 
correlation with; LnMATCAL (-0.659) and LnBPLR (-0.797) at 0.01% level of significance 
(Table 4).  During the Recovery period LnBC has strong positive correlations with; LnAD 
(0.518), LnINVEST (0.728), LnBPLR (0.422), LnBNIFTY (0.426) at 0.01% level of 
significance and has negative correlation (Table 5).  
Table 5: Correlation among variables (recovery period) 
 
 LnAD LnBORROW 
LnMAT
CAL 
LnINV
EST 
LnBPL
R 
LnBNI
FTY LnBC 
LnAD 1       
LnBORROW .275 1      
LnMATCAL .363** .179 1     
LnINVEST .737** .357* -.004 1    
LnBPLR .970** .299* .378** .645** 1   
LnBNIFTY .928** .356* .383** .621** .942** 1  
LnBC .518** .292* .255 .728** .422** .426** 1 
     Notes: **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-
tailed). 
Tables 6, 7 and 8 show the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF 1979) Phillip Perron (PP 
1988) unit-root test results. In both the tests, the null hypothesis is that the series is non-
stationary (possess a unit root) and if the calculated value exceeds the critical value (based on 
Mackinnon, 1996 for ADF and PP test), the null hypothesis may be rejected implying the 
stationary characteristics of the data series.  
Table-6: Stationarity test results (pre-recession period) 
 
Variables At  level Form At First Difference form ADF statistic PP statistic ADF statistic PP statistic 
LnBC -0.428456 -0.431008 -8.908858* -85.32742* 
LnAD -0.879530 -1.457736 -10.29290* -14.75445* 
LnBORROW -0.014152 -0.084157 -8.8621298* -79.40365* 
LnMATCAL -0.633163 -0.557301 -10.14116* -18.52506* 
LnINVEST -0.086942 -0.086942 -8.833085* -84.55829* 
LnBNIFTY -1.583966 -1.627241 -10.06231* -10.02447* 
LnBPLR -1.585209 -1.628026 -10.06809* -10.02983* 
Note: *Significant at 0.01 level.  
 
The results revealed that all the level (first-differenced) variables are insignificant 
(significant) at the 0.01 percent level, indicating that all the variables during these three 
periods are integrated at the first degree and satisfied the condition for the cointegration test. 
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Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) developed this methodology 
(cointegration) for assessing long-run relationships. The methodology applies maximum 
likelihood procedure to determine the presence of cointegrating vectors in a set of non-
stationary time series. 
Table 7: Stationarity test results (recession period) 
 
Variables At  level Form At First Difference form ADF statistic PP statistic ADF statistic PP statistic 
LnBC -0.751725 -0.609777 -12.23925* -12.09305* 
LnAD -1.477376 -1.379730 -13.04749* -15.385588 
LnBORROW -0.390756 -0.390756 -9.981443* -28.56700* 
LnMATCAL -1.232399 -1.341713 -10.120958 -23.34173* 
LnINVEST -1.478795 -1.524909 -8.854521* -12.67635* 
LnBNIFTY -0.692584 -0.647832 -9.883277* -9.883277* 
LnBPLR -1.346230 -1.239941 -9.814503* -9.818384* 
Note: *Significant at 0.01 per cent level.                              
 
Table 8: Stationarity test results (recovery period) 
 
Variables At  level Form At First Difference form ADF statistic PP statistic ADF statistic PP statistic 
LnBC -0.358440 -0.206328 -9.194190* -9.422216* 
LnAD -0.556997 -0.185782 -7.233743* -10.03406* 
LnBORROW -0.977743 -0.977743 -7.495562* -11.73249* 
LnMATCAL -0.602755 -0.638488 -6.936360* -9.765911* 
LnINVEST -2.854436 -2.672870 -8.378243* -9.334602* 
LnBNIFTY -1.467749 -1.365785 -8.533983* -8.471221* 
LnBPLR 0.324520 0.116450 -9.466734* -9.472437* 
Note: *Significant at 0.01 per cent level.  
 
As the number of lag orders selected can affect the number of cointegration, the 
appropriate lags are carefully selected with a number of multivariate diagnostic tests. The 
appropriate  lag orders can be selected from five information criteria (i.e., the likelihood ratio, 
the Final Prediction Error (FPE), the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the Schwarz 
Information Criterion (SIC), and the Hannan Quinn Information Criterion (HQIC)) are first 
determined. For doing cointegration, the study selected lag interval of one (for all three 
models) as suggested by Schwarz Information criteria (SIC). In this study, both trace and 
maximum eigenvalue statistics are considered in determining the number of cointegration 
vectors. In particular, if two test statistics show the same number of cointegration, that 
number is used. If two statistics do not show the same number of cointegration, the number is 
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selected using trace test. Luintel and Khan (1999) have shown that trace test is more robust 
than maximum eigen value criteria in testing the cointegration. 
Having confirmed that integration of the seven series is of the same order (checked for 
three periods); we test whether the seven series are cointegrated over the sample period. The 
numbers in the tables 9, 10 and 11 show the results of the Johansen test. Since the Johansen 
test is based on vector auto regressive model (VAR), we select one period lag for the model 
based on SIC. Starting with the null hypothesis of no cointegration among the variables, trace 
statistics is 220.6801, which is well above the 0.05 critical value. Thus, we reject the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration among these variables at 0.05 and accept that there is one co-
integrating equation.  
Considering the null hypothesis of at most one co-integrating relation, based on the trace 
statistics of 131.3113, which is greater than 0.05 critical value of 83.93712 we reject the null 
hypothesis of at most one co-integrating equation at 0.05 significance level. Similar is the 
case with the second and third cointegration relationship, where we find trace statistics is 
greater than the critical value thus we reject the null hypothesis and infer that there are more 
than three cointegrating relationship between variables.  
Table 9: Results of cointegration analyses (pre-recession period) 
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None * 0.650551 220.6801 111.7805 0.0000 
At most 1 * 0.418264 131.3113 83.93712 0.0000 
At most 2 * 0.326852 85.26360 60.06141 0.0001 
At most 3 * 0.313520 51.62147 40.17493 0.0024 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None * 0.650551 89.36884 42.77219 0.0000 
At most 1 * 0.418264 46.04771 36.63019 0.0030 
At most 2 * 0.326852 33.64212 30.43961 0.0193 
At most 3 * 0.313520 31.97512 24.15921 0.0036 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 4 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level. 
Notes: * Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level. **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-
values. 
 
The result from Maximum Eigen Statistics table also supports that there is more than three 
cointegrating relationship. In addition, we find that Maximum Eigen value is greater than the 
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critical value and hence we reject the null hypothesis of at most three cointegration vectors at 
0.05 per cent level of significance. Hence based on trace test we may conclude that there are 
more than three co-integrating equation among these variables during pre-recession. 
In the similar vein, the statistics in Table 10 shows the cointegrating relationship between 
the study variables during recession. In this case, both statistics (trace and maximum 
eigenvalue) are showing similar results. The trace statistics of 60.93088, which is greater than 
the critical value (54.07904) at 5 % level of significance (see at most two). Therefore, we are 
rejecting the null hypothesis that there are at most two cointegrating vectors and may accept 
the alternative hypothesis of more than two cointegrating relationship among variables.  
Table 10: Results of cointegration analyses (recession period) 
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None *  0.457913  191.9675  134.6780  0.0000 
At most 1 *  0.410861  139.9196  103.8473  0.0000 
At most 2 *  0.329805  94.94674  76.97277  0.0011 
At most 3 *  0.292357  60.93088  54.07904  0.0108 
Trace test indicates 4 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None *  0.457913  52.04788  47.07897  0.0135 
At most 1 *  0.410861  44.97290  40.95680  0.0168 
At most 2**  0.329805  34.01586  34.80587  0.0619 
At most 3 *  0.292357  29.39427  28.58808  0.0394 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level. 
  
Notes: *  and ** denote  rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05  and 0.10 levels. 
Cointegrating relationship among variables during recovery period is shown in the Table 11. 
From these results, it is found that there is more than one cointegrating relationship (based on 
trace test). In case of trace test, the statistic is greater than the critical value at 0.05 level of 
significance and rejecting the null hypothesis of at most one cointegrating relationship. 
However, in case of maximum eigen value criteria it found that there is one co-integrating 
relationship. However, based on Luintel and Khan (1999) suggestion the study preferred trace 
test and inferred that there is more than one cointegrating relationship among study variables 
during recovery period.  
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Table 11: Results of cointegration analyses (recovery period) 
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None * 0.699329 173.7180 134.6780 0.0000 
At most 1 * 0.539903 114.8329 103.8473 0.0077 
At most 2 0.447989 76.79325 76.97277 0.0516 
Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None * 0.699329 58.88519 47.07897 0.0018 
At most 1 0.539903 38.03960 40.95680 0.1028 
At most 2 0.447989 29.11518 34.80587 0.2042 
Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
Notes: * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level. **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999)  
p-values 
 
The normalized cointegration coefficients for the three models are presented in Table 12.  
Table 12: Normalized cointegrating coefficients 
 
LnBC as Endogenous 
Variable 
Pre-recession 
period Recession period 
Recovery 
period 
LnAD 0.848912* 2.617435* 3.384583* 
 (0.13895) (0.79629) (0.34804) 
LnBORROW -0.650012* 1.177967* 0.176190* 
 (0.07507) (0.21337) (0.06679) 
LnMATCAL 0.151451* 0.007027 -0.069528* 
 (0.02822) (0.06319) (0.02058) 
LnINVEST 0.721629* -2.775382* -5.015145* 
 (0.07062) (0.63232) (0.52197) 
LnBNIFTY -7.149430* 0.334245* 0.331396* 
 (1.08430) (0.08295) (0.05755) 
LnBPLR 22.54094* - 2.087602* -0.677602* 
 (2.87292) (0.55803) (0.29096) 
Constant - 2.684247 31.43960* 
 - (7.05854) (5.18886) 
Notes: Figures in parentheses in normalized co integrating vectors are Standard errors. 
* denotes statistical significance at 0.01 level level.   
 
The signs of the coefficients like LnBORROW and LnBNIFTY were found to be negative 
and others are positive during pre-recession (see first column in Table 12). The results show 
that all the variables are significant. We thus infer that bank credit increases with increase in 
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LnAD, LnINVEST, LnMATCAL and LnBPLR and decreases with an increase in 
LnBORROW and LnBNIFTY during pre-recession period.  
During recession (see Table 12, column 2), the results show that, except LnMATCAL, 
all other variables are significant. For LnAD the coefficient is 2.61, signifying that its 0.01 
level increase during recession led to more than 2.6 per cent increase in bank credits. In the 
same way the coefficients for LnBORROW, LnINVEST, LnBNIFTY are 1.17, -2.27(inverse 
relationship), 0.33 and -2.08(inverse relationship) respectively. 
During recovery period (see Table 12 column 3), the variables (LnAD, LnBORROW, 
and LnBNIFTY) were found to be positively significant indicating that the increase in these 
variables led to a positive significant increase in bank credits during recovery period. The 
results show that during this period, LnMATCAL, LnINVEST, and LnBPLR had an inverse 
or negative relationship with bank credit, explaining the decrease in these factors. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper contributes uniquely to the evolving body of literature on bank’s lending behavior 
during times of financial instability/uncertainty, which mostly prevails during the times of 
financial crises. Our findings provides answers to the oft-repeated question “What makes the 
banks squeeze their lending activity during the crisis?”. Broadly, our results are in agreement 
with the stylized facts on bank behavior in the recent financial crisis, especially on reduced 
bank lending, increased competition for retail deposits, and reduced monetary policy 
effectiveness. 
We have found that, during the times of recession, particularly in the emerging markets 
of India, borrowings by banks have a significant positive relationship on the lending behavior 
of the banks. This is because of the fact that banks are unable to garner the much needed 
financial resources for lending through deposits in view of the prevailing factors of 
uncertainty/instability (during recession) which makes the depositors withhold their deposits.  
Instead depositors look for other real asset investments or to hold cash till the re-appearance 
of the signs of financial stability in the markets.  
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Our study has also established that lending rates, even though they were downward 
during the recession period, were not having positively significant relationship with banks’ 
lending. This elucidates that the lending rates were required to be reduced drastically in order 
to infuse bank lending. Further, results indicate that investment activity of the banks had a 
negatively significant relationship with bank lending. The reason is that during the times of 
financial instability, the banks tend to tighten their lending activity by stringent screening and 
rigorous monitoring of their borrowers, thereby increase their investments only if it ensures 
safe returns (profit-seeking behavior and also due to the fall in the state of confidence of 
banks and the nature of firm decision structures). This can be discerned from the fact that, 
while Credit to Deposit Ratio showed a downward trend, Investment to Deposit Ratio showed 
an upward trend during the recession evidencing the era of shortened lending activity of the 
banks. Further, we also notice decreasing Cash to Deposit Ratio during recession period 
which indicates the tight liquidity scenario in view of the financial instability and uncertainty.  
We are of the view that failure to curb this trend of sharp decline in bank lending further 
results in banking crisis (Gentler 2010). Accordingly, we suggest that the bank’s lending 
could be maintained at the relatively same pace during the times of recession too by 
increasing the borrowings rapidly either from the Central Banks or from Government 
supported long term lending institutions. Besides, this measure would also enable the banks 
to tide over the liquidity crisis that resulted out of the financial crisis.  
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